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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20030241-SC

vs.
NORM SMITH,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the concealed weapons charge
be dismissed but incorrectly remanded for a new trial thus violating the tenets of double
jeopardy? In the court of appeals5 this issue was reviewed under an ineffective
assistance of counsel standard, however, it appears to present this Court with a question
of law that is reviewed for correctness. See, State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 549550 (Utah 1996).
2. Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that aggravated assault is not a
lesser included offense that merges into second degree felony use of a concealed

weapon? This issue presents this Court with an issue of statutory construction that is
reviewed for correctness with no particular deference afforded to the ruling. State v.
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). This issue was preserved in a pre-trial
motion (Trial Tr. at 212-218).
"On certiorari review, 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion of
the [trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 61 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2002). That decision is then
reviewed for correctness." State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, \ 7, 65 P.3d 1180.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statulory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The court of appeals affirmed Norm Smith's conviction for aggravated assault and
resisting lawful arrest, but reversed Smith's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon
and remanded the matter for a new trial on that charge. State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52,
65 P.3d 648.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Norm Smith was charge with and bound over for trial for carrying a concealed
weapon, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a peace officer making a
lawful arrest (R. 1-2, 16-17, 20-21, 26-27; Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f7). Smith filed a
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motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the case, including many other motions over the
course of two and a half years, most of which were denied (R. 12-678, 328-39, 589).
Following a five day jury trial, a jury convicted Smith of all four counts as charged
(R. 724-25; 933: 11156-57; Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at JI). Smith moved for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial (R. 727-30, 745-47, 751-73). Those
motions were denied (R. 779-80). Smith was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in prison
for carrying a concealed weapon, zero-to-five years in prison for each aggravated assault
conviction, and six months in jail for interfering with a lawful arrest (R. 829-31; Smith,
2003 UT App 52 at ^[7). The court suspended the sentence and placed Smith on
supervised probation for 36 months, subject to a jail commitment of 60 days, the payment
of $2000, and various other conditions (R. 831-33; Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at f 0 - The
trial court has since terminated his supervised probation (R. 920).
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Smith's conviction for aggravated assault
and resisting lawful arrest, but reversed his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon
and remanded the matter for a new trial on that charge. Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at Tf37.
This Court granted the State's petition for certiorari and part of Smith's petition for
certiorari on August 21, 2003.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Testimony of Officer Johnny Owen
Johnny Owen a deputy with the Washington County Sheriffs Office testified that

on April 9, 1996, he was dispatched to 561 North Kolob Road in Virgin, Utah, at

approximately 4:00 p.m. on a report that a man was throwing rocks and brandishing a
weapon (Trial Tr. at 271-73, 280).1 Deputy Orvin responded to the same scene in a
separate vehicle (Trial Tr. at 273, 275). When the officers arrived, Owen noticed a
vehicle with a person standing nearby (Call) and Smith a little farther ahead on the
property (Trial Tr. at 275). Owen first contacted Call, asked about weapons (Trial Tr. at
278). Owen testified that he started to speak with Smith who started to come towards
Call's vehicle (Trial Tr. at 279-280).
Owen testified that he told Smith that they were there to investigate a report that
he had been throwing rocks and brandishing a weapon (Trial Tr. at 281). Owen asked if
Smith had a weapon and Smith lifted his shirt and exposed a pistol in a holster on his
right side (Trial Tr. at 281). Owen testified that the weapon was not intentionally
concealed but was concealed because the shirt was worn outside of the pants (Trial Tr. at
468).
According to Owen, Smith then put his hand on the butt of the gun (Trial Tr. at
282). Owen said that he asked for the gun for safety reasons while they investigated the
dispatched information (Trial Tr. at 282). Smith told Owen that every time "we showed
up he'd get arrested and he wasn't giving his gun up" (Trial Tr. at 283). Owen continued
to ask for the gun and moved closer to Smith (Trial Tr. at 283). Owen testified that he
"kept asking [Smith] to remove his hand from the butt of the gun" and that he "didn't
want [Smith] to draw the weapon" because "[he] didn't want to have to shoot [Smith] and
l

Owen testified that he saw no one brandish a weapon when he arrived at the
scene (Trial Tr. at 384).
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[he] didn't want to be shot" (Trial Tr. at 323). In response, Smith backed away (Trial Tr.
at 283). According to Owen, Smith was agitated and upset (Trial Tr. at 284). Owen
also testified that he was the only one speaking with Smith and that Orvin was behind
him and he did not know what Orvin was doing or if he ever drew his weapon (Trial Tr.
at 407).
When Smith got close to a partially-built octagon-shaped building on the property,
he took "off to his left and [went] through the windows of the building" (Trial Tr. at 285,
303).2 Owen then approached the building keeping Smith in his sight through another
window frame (Trial Tr. at 305, 308, 416). Orvin then approached the building from the
opposite side approximately six feet away with his gun out (Trial Tr. at 308, 312, 423).
Smith went behind a barrel in the building (Trial Tr. at 309). Owen testified that he
continued to speak with Smith and ask him for the weapon (Trial Tr. at 309). At this
point Owen still did not perceive much of a threat from Smith (Trial Tr. at 424).
According to Owen at some point in the exchange, Smith "made the comment that he
could, he could shoot us" (Trial Tr. at 309). Owen responded that "he might shoot one of
us but the other one would shoot, the other one would shoot him before he could get both
of us" (Trial Tr. at 309). Owen testified that Smith then "drew his weapon" at what
seemed to be an angle towards Orvin, who then pointed his weapon at Smith (Trial Tr. at
310, 430). Smith then crouched down behind the barrel (Trial Tr. at 310).

There was also a trailer on the property and another brownish-red structure that
had a gray roof (Trial Tr. at 334).

Owen testified that at this point "we remained there for a few minutes still trying
to talk [Smith] out of the weapon. Our weapons, we actually started... Well, I actually
started pulling the trigger to fire. And then I kind of noticed that [Smith] relaxed a little
bit. I relaxed my finger. I proceeded and moved to the area of the door in the building
and took another aim from that angle which I had a whole body angle of [Smith's] whole
body at that time" (Trial Tr. at 313-14). Smith was again asked to lower his gun and he
obeyed and laid it on top of the barrel (Trial Tr. at 314). Smith, on command, then placed
his hands on his head and walked over to Owen (Trial Tr. at 315). Orvin then entered the
building and placed Smith in handcuffs (Trial Tr. at 315).
After Smith was placed in Owen's patrol car, Owen went back to the building and
recovered the gun (Trial Tr. at 320). Owen testified that he also located to other guns—a
shotgun and a rifle—behind and to the left from where Smith had been crouching in the
building (Trial Tr. at 320-21). Owen also found shells in the same location (Trial Tr. at
321),
B.

Testimony of Lorin Orvin
Lorin Orvin testified that on April 9, 1996, he was employed as a deputy in the

Washington County Sheriffs Office and that he responded to a dispatched call with
Officer Owen in Virgin, Utah, on a report of brandishing a weapon (Trial Tr. at 499-500,
509). At the location, Orvin testified that he encountered a vehicle and two male
subjects-Norm Smith and Clayton Call (Trial Tr. at 503). Orvin asked Call if he had any
weapons (Trial Tr. at 594). Orvin testified that his role was to provide back-up for Owen
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and that he stayed behind Owen to oversee issues of officer safety while Owen
approached and spoke with Smith (Trial Tr. at 506, 519).
Orvin heard Owen ask Smith about a gun and saw Smith lift his shirt to expose a
holstered gun that sat on his hip (Trial Tr. at 520-21, 581,). Orvin then saw Smith put
his hand on the butt of the gun (Trial Tr. at 522, 597). Orvin said he then pulled out his
gun and put it behind his leg in order to have it concealed yet readily available (Trial Tr.
at 522, 523, 591-92). Contemporaneous to this action by Orvin, conversation continued
between Owen and Smith about putting away the gun and as Owen moved towards him,
Smith retreated (Trial Tr. at 523, 525, 593). Smith then turned around and quickly
entered the octagon-shaped building through one of the window frames (Trial Tr. at 525).
Owen and then Orvin approached the building from opposite sides and Orvin saw Smith
behind some material in the back of the building (Trial Tr. at 526-27). Orvin testified
that at some point during the encounter, Smith said "something about his constitutional
rights or some civil rights, and something to the effect that all you son-of-a-bitches
should be dead" (Trial Tr. at 530). Orvin also testified that he remembered "something
to the effect of what if I pull the gun, what are you going to do, shoot me? And I
remember making, and that's when I made a statement, I said, if you do pull the gun then
you will be shot" (Trial Tr. at 531).
Orvin testified that Smith then dropped to his knees and pointed the gun straight at
him (Trial Tr. at 531). Orvin then fell to the dirt below the concrete and radioed for help
(Trial Tr. at 531). Orvin then came up the side of the building to maintain cover and
pointed his gun towards Smith and told Smith to drop his gun (Trial Tr. at 532). Orvin

heard Owen again communicate to Smith to put the gun down and Smith obeyed (Trial
Tr. at 532-33). Smith, at Owen's command, then placed his hands on his head and
walked towards him (Trial Tr. at 533).
After Smith had been taken to the jail, Smith told Orvin "you could have shot me,
thanks for not shooting me" (Trial Tr. at 545).
C.

Testimony of Sharon Felton
Sharon Felton testified that on the afternoon of April 9, 1996, she observed Smith

on the property next to hers and that he was agitated and walking up and down the
property with a gun in a holster at times and in his hand at other times (Trial Tr. at 106465, 1084, 1097). Felton testified that during the afternoon, Smith through a couple of dirt
clods at her house (Trial Tr. at 1065). In the 911 tape, Felton indicated that rocks had
been thrown (Trial Tr. at 1079). Felton also testified that Smith's shirttail was not tucked
in and that she had seen him untuck it and pull it over the gun he was wearing; and that
this occurred a few minutes before the officers arrived at the property (Trial Tr. at 106668). Felton testified that earlier in the afternoon she heard Smith say to her husband, Ron
Felton, and to Mr. Anderson that the "only good cop is a dead cop" (Trial Tr. at 1068,
1076). Felton testified that she was the one who called dispatch (Trial Tr. at 1069).
Felton also testified that after the officers arrived and asked Smith about a weapon that
Smith informed the officer that he did not have a concealed weapon (Trial Tr. at 1095).

D.

Testimony of Clayton Call
Q

Clayton Call testified that he was with Smith at a piece of property in Virgin,
Utah, on April 9, 1996 (Trial Tr. at 713). Call and Smith had traveled to the properly
together from Rockville (Trial Tr. at 713). The purpose of the visit was to feed the
horses and expect the property (Trial Tr. at 713-14). When they arrived at the property,
Smith noticed that some of his property was missing and that some vandalism had
occurred (Trial Tr. at 714).
Call and Smith then traveled to Coal Pits Mountain to look for the missing
property (Trial Tr. at 715). After a problem with Call's motorcycle, the two returned to
the property in Call's automobile (Trial Tr. at 715-16). Call then left the property and
went to the Bull Cinch Bar where he called Smith's wife, Donna, at the Dream Catcher
Inn in Rockville (Trial Tr. at 717-18). Donna said that she would call the police (Trial
Tr. at 718). As a result of this phone call, Call testified that he expected the police to
arrive at the property (Trial Tr. at 719). When the police still had not arrived a few hours
later, Call again called Donna at the bed and breakfast (Trial Tr. at 720). During the
afternoon, Call and Smith discussed their fears for the safety of the animals at the
property if they were left unattended (Trial Tr. at 721).
Call started to leave the property when he noticed the police coming up the hill so
he immediately reversed his car and went back up to the property (Trial Tr. at 722). Call
got out of his vehicle and he and Smith watched the officers approach by the vehicle
(Trial Tr. at 725).
When the officers left their vehicles and approached, Owen asked Smith if he was
carrying a weapon and Smith responded affirmatively and turned so that the firearm

could be seen around the back where his shirt was tucked in (Trial Tr. at 726-27). Call
testified that Owen and Orvin gave different commands (Trial Tr. at 728). Call testified
that Owen told Smith to remove the pistol and lay it down but that when Smith started to
respond and touched the weapon, Orvin would tell him to not to touch the gun (Trial Tr.
at 729). Call testified that he found the commands confusing but that he told Smith to let
the officers have the gun (Trial Tr. at 730, 766). In a statement written after the incident,
Call indicated that Smith was angry and reluctant to surrender the gun "because other
police had guns drawn" (Trial Tr. at 768).
After Smith retreated into the building through the window frame, Call was told
by the officers to put his hands on the vehicle before both officers proceeded to the
building (Trial Tr. at 730-31, 733). Call testified that he could hear from the police radio
through one of the patrol cars' open window that there was another officer enroute (Trial
Tr. at 733). Call testified that Orvin drew his weapon before Owen (Trial Tr. at 734).
Call tried to converse with the officers but was told to keep quiet (Trial Tr. at 735). In his
written statement, Call indicated that while Smith was in the building he tried to get him
to put the weapon away but that Smith "said every time there were reports written out
they only got lost and nothing ever happened, nothing, well, nothing ever got done.
[Smith], I guess, pulled his, pulled his gun" (Trial Tr. at 773). While Smith was inside
the building and the officers were on the outside, one of the officers—probably Orvin—
"ran around to the door, and as he ran... [Call] could hear him whisper to himself, we
ought to shoot him right hear and now and be over with it" (Trial Tr. at 739).

Once

the officers entered the building, Call testified that he heard "a lot of commotion going on

in there" and that it "[sjounded like a lot of things were being thrown around in there and
somebody being bodyslammed" against the wall as the "whole structure shook" (Trial Tr.
at 742).
Call testified that Smith had been carrying a gun on the property because "[h]e had
been threatened and he was anticipating possibly another problem going on with some
more vandalism" (Trial Tr. at 761).
E.

Testimony of Henry Babcock
Henry Babcock testified that he has been an acquaintance of Smith for 4-5 years

(Trial Tr. at 780). Babcock testified that he recalled the April 9, 1996, incident because
his property is directly to the south of Smith's property (Trial Tr. at 780-81). Babcock
indicated that the officer arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m. (Trial Tr. at 781). Babcock
first observed Smith that day about noon (Trial Tr. at 781). Smith left the property and
then returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. (Trial Tr. at 781). When Smith returned
Babcock noticed that he was wearing a holster on his right side that contained a pistol
(Trial Tr. at 782). Babcock testified that he believed that Smith's shirt was tucked in
because the holster was very obvious (Trial Tr. at 782). Call and Smith removed two
rifles from a bunker in the property and took them into the octagon-shaped building
where they sat in two chairs and talked (Trial Tr. at 783-84).
When the officers arrived they approached Smith and "he seemed to back up away
from them and went around another car, and proceeded to go ahead and get into a, this,
jump through a partially open window, or a window of the partially built building there"
(Trial Tr. at 785-86). Babcock couldn't see what transpired in the building but he heard

voices and heard the officers say "Norm, lay them down, lay it down, or something like
that" (Trial Tr. at 786). Babcock testified that he heard two officer's voices (Trial Tr. at
786). Babcock testified that he saw the officers draw their guns after Smith was in the
building (Trial Tr. at 788).
Babcock also testified that at the time of the officers' arrival, he could not say for
sure whether Smith's shirt was tucked in or out (Trial Tr. at 789).
F.

Testimony of Norm Smith
Norm Smith testified that on April 9, 1996, he was at the property in Virgin when

he had the encounter with the two sheriff deputies involving weapons. (Trial Tr. at 958).
Smith, explaining why he had a firearm on his person, testified that "my wife and two
daughters had been threatened by Mr. Seach, and the horses on the property had been
threatened to be killed, and so we felt that we had two areas that we needed to be
concerned with that particular night especially in light of the vandalism, destruction and
theft that had occurred on the property that day." (Trial Tr. at 871).
Smith testified that when he saw the two officers, he perceived that the officers
were responding to a complaint his wife made earlier that day concerning the vandalism
and that the officers "were coming to help me." (Trial Tr. at 874). Smith testified that
when the officers came to his property on April 9, 1996, he was carrying a firearm on his
hip. (Trial Tr. at 875). Smith testified that his shirt was tucked in when the officers came
so his gun was not concealed. (Trial Tr. at 954, 875).
Smith testified that Officer Owen asked if anyone had a firearm. (Trial Tr. at 875).
Smith testified that he turned sideways so Officer Owen could see the firearm, and said
10

"it's right here." (Trial Tr. at 875). Smith further testified that Officer Owen then
commanded him to "lay down the firearm." Smith testified that he attempted to comply
with Officer Owen's command and reached for the firearm "to pull it out and to lay it
down like he said." Smith also testified that as he did this, Officer Orvin, who was
standing thirty-five to forty-five feet away, began to draw for his gun. (Trial Tr. at 876,
877). Smith asserts that the action by Officer Orvin, drawing for his gun, was a distinct
and different command than the oral command given by Officer Owen. (Trial Tr. at
1140).
Smith testified that at this point, he was afraid to touch the firearm. (Trial Tr. at
890.) He then retreated and jumped through the window of the structure. (Trial Tr. at
878). Smith testified that he asked the cops if they had a warrant and if not they were
trespassing and should leave his property. (Trial Tr. at 878). Smith also testified that he
did not point his weapon at the officers. (Trial Tr. at 924, 982). Smith testified that he
laid the firearm down. (Trial Tr. at 898). Smith was then cuffed and taken to the police
car. (Trial Tr. at 916).
Smith testified that when he was cuffed, the Officer Orvin patted him down and
removed two bullets from Smith's pockets. (Trial Tr. at 917). Smith testified that his
firearm was not loaded during his confrontation with the two officers. (Trial Tr. at 914915). On cross examination, the prosecutor's first line of questioning attempted to
establish Smith's residence during April 9, 1996, to be at the Dream Catcher Inn. (Trial
Tr. at 955-957). Smith claimed that during that time, he resided at the Dream Catcher Inn
and at his place of property in Virgin. (Trial Tr. at 956). The prosecutor's second line of

questioning dealt with Smith's confrontation with the deputies and his handling of the
firearm. (Trial Tr. at 958-961). The prosecutor asked Smith the following:
Filter: By the way, do you have a concealed weapons permit?
Smith: No, I do not.
Filter: Have you ever had one?
Smith: No, I have not.
(Trial Tr. at 961). On redirect, Smith testified that the officers never asked him whether
or not he had a weapons permit. (Trial Tr. at 977).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Smith asserts that the court of appeals erred by holding that aggravated assault is
not a lesser included offense that merges with second degree felony use of a concealed
weapon because this is an "enhancement statute." The plain language of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-1-402(3) and § 76-10-504 demonstrate that under the facts of this case,
aggravated assault is a lesser included offense to use of a concealed weapon requiring
merger of the two offenses.
The court of appeals correctly determined that Smith's trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict when the State presented no evidence
that Smith did not possess a valid firearm permit. However, the court of appeals erred in
remanding this case for a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction. Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, a new trial
violates double jeopardy.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IN NOT A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE FELONY USE OF A
CONCEALED WEAPON

Smith was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 and one count of possession of a concealed
weapon, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-504(3).
Smith asserts that under the facts of this case, his two counts of aggravated assault is a
lesser included offense that merges with second degree use of a concealed weapon.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse these two convictions because they merge with
the use of a concealed weapon charge.
The merger doctrine has been codified at Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(3) and
provides:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An
offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
The court of appeals acknowledged that "third degree aggravated assault was
'established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts required to establish' the
second degree weapons offense," and that "pursuant to a traditional merger analyses, the
underlying aggravated assault charges should merge into the second degree felony"

weapons charge. Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at ^[20 (quoting Utah Code Annotated §76-1402(3)(a)). However, the court of appeals then asserted that Utah Code Annotated § 7610-504(3) is an enhancement statute and "the legislature did not intend merger to apply."
Id. at 122.
Smith asserts that the court's reliance on State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah
1990), is misplaced and that the plain language of §§ 76-1-402 and 76-10-504 demands
that aggravated assault merge with second degree felony use of a concealed weapon.
In McCovey this Court considered whether aggravated robbery was a lesser
included offense that would merge into second degree murder. This Court prior to
McCovey had previously concluded in State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), that
aggravated robbery merged into first degree murder where the aggravated circumstance is
aggravated robbery because "no additional facts or separate elements are required to
prove aggravated robbery after first degree murder" and because "first degree murder
based on the predicate offense of aggravated robbery stands in a greater relationship to
the lesser included offense of aggravated robbery." McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237-38
(quoting Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1313-14).
In reaching its decision in McCovey, this Court stated, "the only reason aggravated
robbery is encompassed within the definition of lesser included offense of felony murder
is that the legislature designated it as an enhancing offense. Aggravated robbery does
not, by its nature, have overlapping elements with any traditional form of murder." Id.
This Court stated that the main reason behind felony murder doctrine "has been to allow
the State to obtain a second degree murder conviction without proving any form of mens

rea.... In essence, it is a strict liability offense that enhances an otherwise unintentional
killing to second degree murder." Id. at 1238. The Court further explained "if the
legislature intended to make the underlying felony [aggravated robbery] a lesser included
offense, then a felon could receive a two-for-one windfall by convincing the jury that the
homicide was unintentional or accidental." Id. The Court concluded that the Utah
Legislature intended that the multiple crimes of felony murder and aggravated robbery
are to be punished as separate crimes. Id. at 1239. This Court did not overrule Shaffer,
but instead chose to allow legislative intent to decide the outcome. Thus, the real reason
behind the Court finding aggravated robbery not to be a lesser included offense in second
degree felony murder statutes was the interest in convicting people for killing others
during the commission of a felony so that the defendant cannot claim that the killing was
accidental.
The same year that McCovey was decided, the Utah Court of Appeals decided
State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1990). In Kinsey, the defendant attempted to
steal $29.98 worth of merchandise at gunpoint, and was convicted of second degree
felony retail theft. 797 P.2d at 426. The defendant appealed his conviction claiming his
two convictions involved one act and the charges should have been merged under a lesser
included offense. Id. at 429. The Court of Appeals was left to decide whether the
defendant could have committed retail theft, enhanced to a second degree felony when
"the actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft" without the defendant
committing the crime of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. Id. The Court found
that the defendant could not be convicted of both charges, holding "where two crimes are
in

such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the
lesser, the defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both." Id. at 430. The theft
charge was enhanced only because the defendant used a concealed weapon in the course
of the theft.
Similarly, in the present case, Smith was convicted of three separate charges
arising out of the same alleged act. In order for Smith to be guilty of carrying a
concealed weapon in commission of a crime of violence, he had to also be guilty of
aggravated assault under the facts of this case. The alleged crime of violence that Smith
committed was an aggravated assault on the police officers because of Smith's alleged
use of a firearm. Under the facts of this case, it is clear that aggravated assault is a lesser
included offense of the second degree felony carrying a concealed weapon. It is also
clear that like in Shaffer, "no additional facts or separate elements are required" to prove
aggravated assault after the elements of the second-degree concealed weapon are shown.
Smith asserts that McCovey is not relevant to the facts of this case. McCovey was
concerned with second degree felony murder and the State's substantial interest in
holding people strictly liable for homicide committed during a felony, even when the
killing was not intended. The facts and interests in the case at bar are more akin to
Shaffer and alternatively to Kinsey, where the court of appeals actually considered the
relevant issue and charge of carrying concealed dangerous weapon.
That aggravated assault under the facts of this case is a lesser included offense of
second degree felony use of a concealed weapon is obvious in light of the plain language
of §§ 76-1-402 and 76-10-504 and also § 76-6-202. Utah Code Annotated § 76-1018

504(3) provides "If the concealed firearm is used in commission of a violent felony...
and the person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second degree felony."
There is no question that Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 is a lesser included
offense of § 76-10-504(3). The real question is whether the legislature intended
aggravated assault not to merge with concealed firearm charge under the facts of this
case. Smith asserts that Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 sheds light on this case and
clarifies the plain meaning of § 76-1-402.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 is the statute prohibiting burglary, and provides:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling,
in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed
in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while
he is in the building (emphasis added).
Here the legislature outlines its intent to make sure that these acts are separate offenses to
which merger does not apply.
Conversely Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-504 does not include such language.
Smith asserts, therefore, that had the legislature intended to make § 76-10-504 a separate
offense to which merger does not apply, then the legislature would have included
language similar to that contained in the burglary statute. On the other hand, Utah Code

Annotated § 76-1-402(3) plainly provides that a defendant shall not be convicted of both
the offense charged and the included offense. Smith asserts that the court of appeals'
decision impermissibly nullifies § 76-1-402 and that the courts' conclusion that the two
aggravated assault convictions in this case do not merge with second degree felony use of
a concealed weapon is incorrect and should be reversed.

H.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REMANDING THE
CONCEALED WEAPON CHARGE FOR A NEW TRIAL

At trial, jury instruction #13D expressly required the State to prove that Smith
"[d]id not have a valid concealed firearm permit" (R. 718). The State presented no
evidence in its case-in-chief that Smith did not have a concealed weapon permit and the
court of appeals correctly concluded that Smith's trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to move for a directed verdict on this charge. Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at ^[37. However,
Smith asserts that the court of appeals incorrectly held that a new trial on this issue does
not violate double jeopardy. Id. at ^[37.
The court of appeals erroneously concluded that remanding this issue for a new
trial "does not violate the tenet of double jeopardy, because we reverse Smith's
conviction for 'trial error' and not for insufficiency of the evidence." Smith, 2003 UT
App 52 at ^35, n.8. Smith asserts that his trial counsel's performance was found
deficient, not due to trial error, but because trial counsel failed to move for a directed
verdict because of insufficient evidence. Accordingly, this conviction should be reversed
with prejudice.
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The court of appeals' reliance on State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (Utah 1980) and
State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996), is misplaced. In both cases, this Court
reversed convictions and remanded for a new trial because of the trial courts' "erroneous
introduction of evidence," not because the evidence was insufficient. Higginbotham, 917
P.2d at 550.
This Court in Higginbotham relied on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct.
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and stated:
[T]he United States Supreme Court held that when a defendant's conviction is
reversed by an appellate court on the sole ground that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial
on the same charge. 437 U.S. at 14, 98 S.Ct. at 2148. However, reversal for trial
error does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to
prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted
through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g.,
incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence.... Id. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149.
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551.
The court of appeals' decision erodes the fundamental prohibition against being
twice put in jeopardy. The United States Supreme Court has explained, 'The underlying
idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,
is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to

embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity...." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223,
2L.Ed.2dl99(1957).
In this case, double jeopardy bars a new trial because the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to convict Smith. The court of appeals' reversal was not based on
trial error, but rather on ineffective assistance of counsel due to insufficiency of the
evidence. Allowing the State to prosecute Smith for the same charge, even though it
failed to present sufficient evidence at the first trial, clearly violates double jeopardy and
would expose Smith to the miscarriages of justice outlined in Green.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Smith respectfully asks this Court to affirm the court of
appeals' decision that the evidence was insufficient to convict Smith for carrying a
concealed weapon, but to reverse the court of appeals' decision that the case be remanded
for a new trial and to reverse the decision that the two aggravated assault charges did not
merge with the second degree felony use of a concealed weapon.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 2004.
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THORNE, Judge:
Kl
Norm Smith appeals from convictions for using a concealed
weapon in the commission of a crime of violence, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (1995), and
two counts of aggravated assault, both third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995), We affirm in part
and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND1
%2
On the morning of April 9, 1996, Smith and his friend
Clayton Call drove to Smith's property in Virgin, Utah. Once
there, Smith suspected that someone had vandalized or stolen some
1. H , On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict and-present conflicting
evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised on
appeal.'" State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,^2, 52 P.3d 1210 (quoting
State v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2,1(2, 40 P.3d 611), cert denied. 2003
U.S. Lexis 935, 71 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003).

of his personal property. Both men left to look for Smith's
missing property. Smith retrieved a holstered pistol from his
residence and placed it around his waist. Smith then telephoned
his wife and told her to report the suspected theft and
vandalism.
H3
Both men returned to the property, where Smith spoke to his
^neighbors, Ron and Sharon Felton. Afterwards, for reasons not
clear from the record, Smith began pacing up and down the
property and throwing dirt clods at the Felton1s home, prompting
Sharon Felton to call 911.
K4
Eventually, Call left, but returned to warn Smith that two
sheriff cars were heading toward the property. Shortly before
Deputies Johnny Owen and Lorin Orvin arrived, Sharon Felton
observed Smith pull his shirt down, covering the pistol. After
the two deputies exited their vehicles, Deputy Owen advised Smith
that they had received a complaint that he was brandishing a
weapon. When Deputy Owen asked Smith if he had a weapon, Smith
lifted up his shirt to expose his pistol and placed his hand on
the butt oE the gun. Deputy Owen asked Smith to surrender the
gun, but Smith refused'.
1(5 Deputy Owen slowly moved toward Smith and repeatedly asked
him to surrender the gun. Smith backed away, turned, ran, and
hid in a partially-constructed building on the property. The
deputies pursued him, positioning themselves outside two separate
windows.
1[6 Once in the building, Smith attempted to conceal himself
behind several garbage cans. The deputies urged Smith to
surrender his weapon. When Smith responded that he could shoot
the deputies, Deputy Orvin told Smith that although he may very
well shoot one of them, the other would shoot Smith before he
could shoot them both. Smith then dropped to his knees and
pointed his pistol directly at Deputy Orvin. Deputy Orvin took
cover and radioed for assistance.
H7
After several minutes of negotiation, Smith surrendered, and
was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a
lawful arrest. A jury convicted Smith on each count. The trial
court suspended prison terms of one to fifteen years on the
second-degree felony and zero to five years on each aggravated
assault charge. The court also sentenced Smith to serve 60 days
in the county jail, pay $2,000 in fines, $300 in costs, and serve
3 6 months probation. Smith now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
18
Smith first argues -that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to call witnesses and to confront the witnesses against
him. When reviewing a trial court's decision not to allow a
defendant to call a witness or to limit the cross-examination of
a witness, we "review the legal rule applied for correctness and
the application of the rule to the facts of the case for an abuse
of discretion." State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9,1(17, 41 P.3d
1137.
19
Smith next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
merge the aggravated assault charges with the concealed weapon
charge. "Merger issues present questions of law, which we review
for correctness." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,110, 55 P.3d
1131, cert denied, 2003 Utah Lexis 4 (Utah Jan. 13, 2003).
1lQ Smith next argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in the
second degree. "In considering an insufficiency-of-evidence
claim, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the verdict."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993).
111 Smith also argues that the trial court committed plain error
in failing to instruct the jury that threatening with a dangerous
weapon is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. To
establish plain error, Smith must show that: "(i) an error was
made; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the
error, a more favorable outcome was reasonably likely " State v.
Helmick, 2000 UT 70,19, 9 P.3d 164.
112 Finally, Smith argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. We review this claim as a matter of law:
See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32,120, 984 P.2d 37S.
ANALYSIS
1. Right to Call and Confront Witnesses
1l3 Smith first asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to call a witness when the trial court denied his request
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to call Ron Felton.2 To establish a violation of his
constitutional right to .call a witness, "a criminal defendant
. . . must make some possible showing that the testimony of the
absent witness 'would have been both material and favorable to
his defense. 1 " State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 274 (Utah 1985)
(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernalr 458 U.S. 858, 873,
102 S. Ct. 3440, 3449 (1982)). "Testimony is material, and its
exclusion therefore prejudicial, if there is a reasonable
probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the
trial." Id. at 275.
1l4 Here, Smith asked to call Ron Felton as a witness. Smith
had spoken with Ron Felton several hours before the deputies
arrived and Smith alleged that Ron Felton would have testified
that Smith had been calm during that conversation. Smith argued
that Ron Felton's testimony was necessary to rebut testimony that
he was agitated and excited when the deputies first arrived at
the property. The trial court excluded Ron Felton's testimony
because it found the testimony to be too attenuated from the
encounter with the deputies to be relevant or material.
fl5 Smith's demeanor hours before the deputies arrived has no
bearing on whether he, in fact, carried a concealed weapon,
assaulted the deputies, or interfered with a lawful arrest hours
later. Furthermore, Smith's own witness, Call, testified that
immediately before and during the incident, Smith was angry and
agitated. Smith also acknowledged, in his own testimony, that he
was "irritated" with the sheriff's office and its deputies. In
light of the testimony of both Smith and Call, and the
intervening time lapse, it is extremely unlikely that Ron
Felton's testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial.
Thus, the testimony was not sufficiently relevant or material and
the trial court did not violate Smith's Sixth Amendment rights
when it excluded the testimony.
1l6 Smith next argues that the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him when the
trial court limited his cross-examination of Deputy Orvin. This
court has held that trial judges may impose reasonable limits on
2. At trial, Smith sought to call Ron Felton to rebut Deputy
Owen's testimony that Smith had been agitated during his
encounter with the deputies. The trial court found the evidence
too attenuated to be relevant and denied Smith's request. In
contrast, on appeal Smith argues that Ron Felton's testimony was
relevant to rebut Sharon Felton's testimony. However, Smith did
not renew his request to call Ron Felton after Sharon Felton
testified and does not argue plain error on appeal. Thus, we
review only the trial court's ruling that Ron Felton's testimony
was too attenuated to be relevant.
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cross-examination if interrogation is Mlrepetitive or only
marginally relevant.'" Chavez, 2002 UT App 9 at fl9 (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall,-475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435
(1986)).
Hl7 It is within the trial court's permitted range of discretion
to limit cross-examination on matters which are either marginally
relevant or pointlessly repetitive. See id^ Here, prior to
cross-examination, Deputy Orvin testified for approximately
thirty-fourvminutes over"the course of two days. Smith then
cross-examined him for approximately fifty minutes before the
trial court ordered a recess. During that recess; the court
advised Smith that he was imposing a thirty-minute time limit on
the remainder of Smith's cross-examination because the Gourt
believed that Smith was "straying off into the minutiae." After
thirty minutes of additional cross-examination, the court
informed Smith that he had reached his time limit. However, upon
Smith's request, the court allowed him to continue asking
questions regarding his surrender. When it became obvious that
the cross-examination was no longer relevant, the trial court
directed Smith to stop.
i|l8 Thus, Smith was given over eighty minutes to cross-examine
Deputy Orvin. Smith chose to use this time to question Deputy
Orvin about such things as the location of the deputies1 cars,
the type of animals on the property, the characteristics of the
fence, and other matters irrelevant to the proceedings. A
defendant is not entitled to an unlimited or pointless
examination of witnesses. See generally id. After reviewing the
record, we conclude that<the trial court's limitation did not
prevent Smith from eliciting testimony necessary to his defense.
The trial court simply restricted Smith from questioning the
witness about matters which were only marginally relevant or that
were pointlessly repetitive of earlier testimony. Thus, Smith
was given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Orvin
and his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him
was not violated.
II. Merger of Lesser Included Offense
fl9 Smith next argues that aggravated assault is a lesser
included offense of second-degree use of a concealed weapon and
^the trial court erred by refusing to merge the two crimes.3
"Merger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect
criminal defendants from being twice punished for committing a
single act that may violate more than one criminal statute."
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,1(17, 55 P.3d 1131. This principle

3. Smith preserved this issue by raising it in a pretrial
motion.
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has been codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999), which
provides that " [a] defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both
the offense charged and the included offense."
f20 Here, to convict Smith of carrying a concealed weapon in the
second-degree, the State had to prove that Smith used a concealed
weapon in the commission of a "crime of violence," in this case
aggravated assault. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (1995).
Accordingly, to convict Smith of a second degree felony the State
had to prove each and every element of aggravated assault plus
the elements of the weapon charge. Consequently, the thirddegree aggravated assault was "established by proof of the same
or less than all of the facts required to establish" the seconddegree weapons offense. Utah Code Ann § 76-1-402(3)(a).
Pursuant to a traditional merger analysis, the underlying
aggravated assault charges should merge into the second-degree
felony. S£e, e.g.. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,1116, 994 P.2d
1243 (noting "the inquiry of whether one crime is a lesser
included offense of a greater crime under section 76-1-402, [and
merges therein] turns on the statutorily defined elements of the
two crimes") *
1|21 To counter Smith1 s contention that the crimes should merge,
the State relies upon the reasoning found in State v. McCovey,
803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). In McCovey, the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that an underlying felony did not merge into a felony
murder charge. See id. at 123 9. Central to the court's
conclusion was its determination that the felony murder statute
was an enhancement statute. See id. at 123 8-3 9. The court
stated that "enhancement statutes are different in nature than
other criminal statutes." Id. at 123 7. By creating an
enhancement statute the legislature communicated its intent that
underlying crimes not merge with the specific enhanced crime.
See generally id. at 1239; see also State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99,163, 37 P.3d 1073 (noting the court in McCovev "explicitly
premised [its] holding [not to merge] on the legislature's
intent").
122 After considering Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 in light of
McCovey, we agree with the State and conclude that it is most
properly characterized as an enhancement statute to which~the
legislature did not intend merger to apply. The legislature
determined that " [i]f the concealed firearm is used in the
commission of a crime of violence as defined in [s]ection
76-1-501, and the person is a party to the offense" then the
concealed weapon offense is enhanced to a second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3). The penalties imposed by section
76-10-504 increase proportionally to the increased risk to the
public, and this graduated punishment scale is indicative of an
enhancement statute. Moreover, " [i]t is the prerogative of the
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legislature to prescribe the punishment for crimes. Included
therein is the authority to increase the degree of crime, where
instruments of violence,-* such as explosives or firearms are
used." State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95 (Utah 1978) (footnote
omitted).
^[23 We conclude that the legislature intended section 76-10-504
to act as an enhancement statute and thereby communicated its
intent that the underlying violent crime remain separate from the
concealed weapon charge. Thus, we conclude that Smith's claim
that his aggravated assault charges should have merged with the
concealed weapon charge is without merit.
III. Insufficiency of the Evidence
1|24
Smith claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the jury's verdict that he used a concealed firearm in the
commission of a crime of violence.4 Smith asserts that the State
failed to meet its burden of proof in showing that he "knowingly
and intentionally" concealed the firearm. However, section 7610-504(3) does not specify a culpable mental state. Thus,
contrary to Smith's argument, the State was not required to prove
intent or knowledge; rather, if the evidence was sufficient to
show that ^Smith's conduct was reckless, the State has met its
burden. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999) (noting when an
offense is not a strict liability offense and does not specify a
culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall
suffice to establish criminal responsibility").
f25 Here, the State presented evidence that Smith picked up a
holstered pistol at his residence and put it around his waist.
The State also presented evidence that just before the deputies
arrived at the property, Smith untucked his shirt so that it
obscured the pistol from view, The deputies testified that upon
arriving at the property, they did not see the pistol and had to
question Smith about its existence. Upon admitting that he had a
pistol^ Smith had to raise his shirt to reveal it. This is
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have
determined that Smith recklessly or intentionally concealed the
pistol.
4. Smith later argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to request a directed verdict on his concealed
weapon charge when the State presented no evidence that Smith did
not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Smith, however,
does not argue this as a basis for finding the evidence
insufficient, for during his defense he testified that he did not
possess such a permit. Consequently, we reserve our discussion
of the State's failure to present such evidence during its caseIn- chief to Smith's ineffectiveness argument.
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H26 Smith also claims the evidence was insufficient to establish
that he used ci concealed firearm in the commission of a crime of
violence because the pistol became unconcealed during the
aggravated assault. The plain language of the statute does not
require that the commission of the crime be contemporaneous with
the concealment of the weapon. Nor does Smith present case law,
either from Utah or elsewhere, to support such a proposition.
Thus, we concLude that the trial court did not commit error in
refusing to set aside the verdict on this basis.
IV. Plain Error
H27 Smith next claims that the trial court committed plain error
in failing to instruct the jury that threatening with a dangerous
weapon, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506, is a lesser
included offense of aggravated assault. To establish plain
error, Smith must show that "(i) an error was made; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error //as harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more
favorable outcome was reasonably likely." Helmick, 2000 UT 70 at
19. *
f28 Smith relies on State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984),
to support his claim of plain error. In Oldroyd, the Utah
Supreme Court; held that the defendant' s use of a weapon could
have constituted either aggravated assault or threatening with a
dangerous weapon and that the failure of the trial court to
instruct the jury on this lesser included offense, after the
defendant revested such an instruction, was reversible error.
See id. at 554-56.
1(29 Smith1 s reliance upon Oldroyd is misplaced. In Oldroyd, the
defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the
crime of threatening with a dangerous weapon because the evidence
at trial supported such an instruction- See id at 553. In
contrast, Smith never requested such an instruction and
maintained his innocence throughout the trial. Smith1s defense
was that he was unable to comply with the deputies1 request to
surrender his weapon because he received conflicting instructions
as to how to surrender the weapon.
130 In light of a claim of total innocence, it was not plain
error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the
lesser included crime of threatening with a dangerous weapon when
there was no request to do so by either party. " [A] n accused may
choose not to request instructions on lesser included offenses as
a matter of trial strategy, usually in the belief that he can
defeat the greater charge, but might not*be able to defeat a
lesser included offense.11 State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah
1982) . Smith and his trial counsel could have made a reasonable
strategic decision not to instruct the jury on the crime of
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threatening with a dangerous weapon out of fear that the jury
might convict Smith of that crime if it was not able to agree
that he was guilty of aggravated assault.5 Thus, the trial court
did not err in failing to give this instruction.
V. Ineffective-Assistance of Counsel6
131 Smith claims that his counsel was ineffective because he did
not request a dismissal of the concealed weapon charge after the
State failed to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief that
Smith did not have a concealed weapon permit. "To show
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness [,] and (2) that but for
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different," ~
Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,1l9, 61 P.3d 978 (quotations and
citations omitted).

5. Smith also raises the failure to request an instruction on a
lesser included offense as grounds for finding his trial counsel
ineffective. However, when omitting an instruction appears to be
a matter of trial strategy, it will not be a basis for finding
trial counsel ineffective. Cf. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627,
635-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting an ineffectiveness claim
failed because defendant could not disprove that omission of the
jury instruction was a "conscious trial strategy").
6. While Smith was represented by counsel at his trial, he took
a very active role in his own representation. For example, the
trial court allowed Smith to conduct direct and crossexaminations of witnesses and to present argument to the court.
The trial court's decision to allow Smith to have counsel and yet
appear to represent himself (on several occasions throughout the
proceedings, Smith claimed he was acting either as co-counsel or
pro se) is in conflict with our jurisprudence. See State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,115, 979 P.2d 799 (noting that the right to
represent oneself and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are
"rriutually exclusive rights"). After reviewing the record, we
conclude that Smith's active participation in his own defense
frustrated the judicial process. See id. at 1l7 (noting that
"[a] criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly
procedures, to choose between waiver [of counsel] and another
course of action"(quotations and citations omitted)(second
alteration in original)). We strongly caution trial courts from
allowing defendants to represent themselves and have counsel, for
it creates a situation where a defendant may both represent
himself at trial and argue ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal.
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H3 2 Pursuant to both section 76-10-504(1) (b)7 and jury
instruction #13D, the State was required to prove that Smith did
not have a valid permit :to carry a concealed weapon. However, in
its case-in-chief, the State presented no evidence that Smith
lacked such a permit. The State's failure to present evidence to
satisfy this necessary element of the offense would have entitled
Smith to a dismissal on that count. See, e.g., State v.
Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App 289,18, 988 P.2d 949, cert denied. 4 P.3d
1289 ("If the prosecution has failed to present sufficient
evidence to support its case, the trial court should dismiss.").
133 Trial counsel's failure to argue this lack of evidence after
the State rested does not appear to have served a tactical
purpose at trial; nor has the State offered a possible tactical
purpose on appeal. "When no possible explanation or tactical
reason exists for such a decision, we have held that the first
part of the [ineffective assistance of counsel] test is
satisfied." Finlavson, 2000 UT 10,^24 (citation omitted). We
conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of
evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is "so deficient
as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.11
Wickham, 2002 UT 72 at 1l9.
K34 Moreover, we conclude that "but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would have been different." Id. (quotation and
citation omitted). Had trial counsel raised this lack of
evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court
would have dismissed the concealed weapon charge. Cf. Kihlstrom,
1999 UT App 289 at 18.
c

35 The State argues that even had Smith's counsel moved for a
directed verdict based on a lack of evidence, the State could
have "properly and with little difficulty . . . moved to reopen
and supply the missing evidence." State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah

7.

Section 76-10-504 provides
[A] person without a valid concealed firearm
permit who carries a concealed dangerous
weapon which is a firearm and that contains
no ammunition is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.

If the concealed firearm is used in the
commission of a crime of violence . . - and
the person is a party to the offense, the
person is guilty of a second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann § 76-10-504(1) (b) , (3) (1999).

10

323, 234 P.2d 600, 601 (1951). We are unconvinced. A trial
court has discretionary authority to determine whether to reopen
a case to admit additional evidence. See State v. Duncan, 102
Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 '(1942). Here, where the State
obviously failed to introduce a necessary element of the crime,
we are not convinced that the trial court would have necessarily
allowed the State to reopen its case and supply the missing
evidence- Accordingly, because of trial counsel's ineffective
assistance related to this single charge, we reverse Smith's
conviction for second-degree concealment of a dangerous weapon
and remand for a new trial on that count.8

8. Remanding for a new trial on this count does not violate the
tenets of double jeopardy, because we reverse Smith's conviction
for "trial error" and not for insufficiency of the evidence.
"[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished
from evidentiary insufficiency, does not
constitute a decision to the effect that: the
government has failed to prove its case. As
such, it implies nothing with respect to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather,
it is a determination that a defendant has
been convicted through a judicial process
which is defective in some fundamental
respect."
State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 347 (Utah 1980) (alterations in
original) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.
Ct. 2141, 2149 (1978)) .
In State v. Hicrainbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996), the Utah
Supreme Court excluded all evidence erroneously admitted at
trial, see id. at 550, and concluded that without the evidence,
the state had failed to prove "an essential element of the
charge." Id. The court then reversed and remanded for a new
trial on that count. See id. at 551. Relying upon Lamorie, 610
P.2d at 347, the court stated:
The court in Lamorie held, as we do here,
that the prosecution failed to prove an
essential element of the charge. The court
remanded for a new trial after reversing the
conviction, holding that doing so does not
place the accused in double jeopardy because
the error giving rise to the reversal, i.e.,
the trial courtfs erroneous introduction of
evidence, was "trial error" as distinguished
from insufficiency of the evidence.
iigginbotham, 917 P.2d at 550 (citations omitted).
Here, the basis for our reversal is -that Smith was deprived
Df his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
i determination that implies nothing regarding Smith's guilt or
tnnocence. Rather, our conclusion that Smith's trial counsel was
(continued...)
'90236-CA
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CONCLUSION
136 The trial court did: not deny Smith his Sixth Amendment right
to call witnesses, or to confront witnesses against him. The
evidence was sufficient to convict Smith for aggravated assault,
carrying a concealed weapon in the second degree, and resisting a
lawful arrest. The trial court properly denied Smith1s request
to, merge the aggravated assault charges into the second-degree
concealed weapon charge. It was not error for the trial court to
fail to instruct on a lesser included offense nor was trial
counsel ineffective for not demanding such an instruction.
i|37 However, we conclude that Smith's trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to move for a directed verdict after the
State failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a
valid concealed weapon permit during its case in chief.
Accordingly, we affirm Smith's convictions for aggravated assault
and resisting a lawful arrest, but reverse and remand Smith's
conviction for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon for a new
trial.

William A. Thorne Jr
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WE CONCUR:

J u d i t h M. B i l l i n g s ,
Associate Presiding Judge

JJ*r£gory K. Orine, Judge

8. (...continued)
ineffective speaks to an "error in the trial process and . . .
not an error in judgment concerning the quantum of evidence
needed to convict and sentence." Seeflfratev. Palmer. 600 N.W.2d
756, 780 (Neb. 1999} (Connolly, J., concurring), cert d^m'^ 5 2 8
U.S. 1192, 120 S, Ct. 1248 (2000). Thus, the error giving rise
to the reversal in this case is trial error and remanding for a
new trial does not violate double jeopardy.
12

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
History: C. 1953,76-5-102.8, enacted by L.
1999, ch. 274, § 1.
Effective-Dates. — Laws 1999, ch. 274

76-5-103

became effective on May 3, 1999, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

76-5-103, Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
tion (lXb); substituted "A violation of Subsection (lXa)" for "Aggravated assault" and "second degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2);
and added Subsection (3).
Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101.
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.

History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10;
1989, ch. 170, § 2; 1995, ch. 291, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added "under
circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection QXa)" to the beginning of Subsec-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
circumstances become deadly or dangerous
weapon was prejudicial error as it might have
directed minds of jury away from crucial issue
as to whether defendant used razor blade as a
deadly weapon. State v. Ireland, 22 Utah 2d 17,
447 P.2d 375 (1968).

ANALYSIS

Dangerous weapon.
Defense of habitation.
Evidence.
—Sufficient.
Included offense.
Indictment or information.
Instructions.
—Citizen's arrest.
—Flight.
—Vicarious liability.
Jury question.
Object of threat.
—Victim.
Recklessness.
Self-defense.
Serious bodily injury.
Threatening with dangerous weapon distinguished.
Voluntary intoxication.
Cited.

Defense of habitation.
Defendant's appearances at his estranged
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him
no proprietary right or justification to consider
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation,"
and his aggravated assault on his wife's overnight male companion was therefore not justified by § 76-2-405. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d
984 (Utah 1986).

Dangerous weapon.
Under former statute which described assault with deadly weapon, character of weapon
could be inferred from wounds or other indicia,
*ven though name or precise character of the
^instrument could not be proven. State v.
Jukanovich, 45 Utah 372, 146 P. 289 (1915).
A razor could be a deadly weapon under
former statute describing assault with a deadly
-weapon. State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P.
;1071 (1915).
Instructing jury that fist could under certain

Evidence.
In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the
trial court's admission of a knife, similar to the
one used in the assault, and a ruler, illustrative
of the testimony of a witness and indicative of
the actual length of the weapon, was not unduly prejudicial. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168
(Utah 1985).
—Sufficient.
Evidence indicating that defendant had
threatened his former wife and her father with
loaded sawed-off shotgun was sufficient, if believed by jury, to support conviction of defendant for assault with deadly weapon. State v,
Dunnivan, 26 Utah 2d 147,486 R2d 393 (1971).
The defendant's conduct in pulling a loaded
.38 caliber revolver from his waistband and
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

76-10-501

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
i Law Review. — The Individual Right
t Arms. An Illusory Public Pacifier9,1986
Kev 751

10-501.

Definitions.

jsed m this part:
(1) (a) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that
is covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not
be aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use.
(b) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a concealed dangerous weapon if it is a firearm which is unloaded and is securely
encased.
|v (2) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, murder, manslaugh&r, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortm, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a
ngerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable
imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprisonent for more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these
lenses.
U<}) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background
&eck conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a
idgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where
\\v firearms dealer conducts business.
14) (a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. The following factors shall be used in determining whether a
knife, or any other item, object, or thing not commonly known as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was
used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object,
or thing may be used.
(b) "Dangerous weapon" does not include any explosive, chemical,
or incendiary device as defined by Section 76-10-306.
(6) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under crimes and
nnal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling,
ftfiing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a
iii or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
M6) "Division" means the Criminal Investigations and Technical Serf»6 Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section
•10-103.
17) "Enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
4fl) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-ofF shotgun, rifle
r-*awed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous weapon
Dm which is expelled a projectile by action of an explosive.
r
(0) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form created by the
mion to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a
indgun from a dealer in the state.
435

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY

76-10-504

gigte statute making it illegal for felon to have
Saiession or control of firearm or other danJ^us weapon, 66 A.L.R.4th 1240

76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon — Penalties.
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3):
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in
Section 76-10-501, which is not a firearm on his person or one that is
readily accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as
defined in this part, in a place other than his residence, property, or
business under his control is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; and
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a sawed-off rifle
is guilty of a second degree felony.
<3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of violence
as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense, the
person is guilty of a second degree felony.
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful
taking of protected or unprotected wildlife as defined in Title 23, Fish and
Game, from carrying a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm with a barrel
:
length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of wildlife does not occur:
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of that municipality's
ordinances; or
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 41-6-1.
History: C. 1953,76-10-504, enacted by L.
cn. 80, § 2; 1997, ch. 289, § 13.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1995,ch.80,§ 2 repeals former § 76-10-504, as
•acted by Laws 1982, ch. 17, § 1, relating to
t^nying concealed dangerous weapons, and
^Sacts the present section, effective May 1,
-1905.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, added a reference
to § 76-10-501 in Subsection (lXa); added "Fish
and Game" after Title 23" in Subsection (4);
and made grammatical changes,
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INSTRUCTION NO 15 Q

Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous
Weapon, as charged in Count I of the Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime
1.

That the defendant, Norm Smith,

2.

On or about April 9, 1996 (although the exact date is immaterial),

3.

In Washington County, State of Utah,

4.

Did carry a concealed dangerous weapon which was a firearm,

5.

Did not have a valid concealed firearm permit, and

6.

Did use the concealed firearm in the commission of a crime of violence.

If you find that the evidence establishes each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. If you find that the evidence fails to establish one or more
of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.

